On Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty by Tyutin, Anton & Zaporozhets, Vera
 17‐807	
	
	
	
	
“On	Legislative	Lobbying	under	Political	Uncertainty”	
	
	
Anton	Tyutin	and	Vera	Zaporozhets	
May	2017	
On Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty
(preliminary)
Anton Tyutin Vera Zaporozhetsy
2016
Abstract
We study a simple inuence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision
of a legislature via monetary o¤ers to one or more members. The type of a legislator
is the relative weight he/she places on social welfare as compared to money. We study
the equilibria of this lobbying game under political certainty and uncertainty, and
examine the circumstances under which the lobby is successful, and the amount of
money invested in the political process. Special attention is paid to three primitives
of the environment: the budget available for lobbying, the internal organization of the
legislature and the proportion of badand goodlegislators in the political arena.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the complexity of legislative process shapes the
special interest politics. To do so we consider a simple inuence game, in which a single
lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature by making monetary o¤ers to one
or more members. We examine how the voting outcome and the monetary contributions
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o¤ered to the legislators depends on the lobbys willingness to pay, the legislatorspreferences
and the decision-making process within the legislature. We show that the supermajorities
may occur due to the uncertainty about the legislators preferences. Moreover, the size
of supermajority decreases when the lobbys willingness to pay increases, though the total
spendings on capturing the legislature increases.
We depart from the voluminous literature based on the common agency setting1 by
relaxing the assumption that policies are set by a single individual or by a cohesive, well-
disciplined political party. In reality, most policy decisions are made rather by a group of
elected representatives acting as a legislative body. Even when the legislature is controlled
by a single party (as it is necessarily the case in a two-party system if the legislature consists
of a unique chamber), the delegation members do not always follow the instructions of their
party leaders. In situations with multiple independent legislators, special interest groups
face a subtle problem in deciding how to allocate their resources to inuence policy choices.
For instance, should the lobby seek to solidify support among those legislators who would
be inclined to support its positions anyway, or should it seek to win over those who might
otherwise be hostile to its views? The answer to this question depends on the rules of
the legislative process and the optimal strategy for wielding inuence would vary with the
institutional setting.
In this paper we focus on the binary setting, i.e., we assume that the policy space consists
of two alternatives: the status quo versus the change or reform. While simplistic, we think
that many policy issues t that formulation. In such case, there is no room for agenda setting,
and the unique role of the legislature is to select one of the two options through voting. A
legislature is then described by a simple game (N;W) where N is the set of legislators (or
parties, if there is some strong party discipline) and W is the list of winning coalitions: the
reform is adopted if and only if the coalition of legislators voting for the reform belongs to
that list.
The preference of the lobby is dened by the amount of money W0 that would be gained
1The common agency framework has been pionnered by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001) to study
trade policy, commodity taxation and other policies.
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by its members if the reform was adopted. Following Grosssman and Helpman (1994),
we assume that each legislator seeks to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and
monetary contributions. Therefore, in this setting, each legislator i is simply described by a
single parameter i denoting the weight that he puts on social welfare2. This parameter is
referred hereafter as being the type of the legislator. The lower the value of i is, the cheaper
legislator i is, and therefore there is a sense in which we can qualify politicians with low 
as bador corrupted as they are more willing to depart from social welfare when deciding
upon which policy to implement3.
In this paper the lobby does not face any competition from another group. There are
evidences of a single lobby prevalence in many areas such as trade policy and regulation
(e.g., Leaver and Makris, 2006 and Dal Bo, 2007). On the contrary, we focus on the conict
between the lobby and the legislature. In particular, we assume that the legislators are
individually against the policy pushed forward by the lobby. In the absence of contributions
any legislator would vote against the reform and support the status quo. An example may
be a protectionist industrial lobby trying to introduce trade barriers.
The exogenous parameters of our strategic environment are:
 The economic stakes W0 and W1 that describe the respective levels of social welfare
under the reform and the status quo. We assume that the policy is socially less desirable as
compared to the status quo, i.e.,W1  W0. We call the ratio W0W1  1 the e¢ ciency threshold,
whose magnitude denes the superiority of the status quo over the reform.
 The simple game (N;W) which describes the legislative process.
2The idea that  could be an adverse selection parameter is suggested in Grossman and Helpman (1992)
and is the main motivation of Le Breton and Salanié (2003).
3Some empirical estimates of this parameter have been provided in the common agency setting. Interest-
ingly, Golberg and Maggi (1999) nd that the 1983 U.S. pattern of protection is consistent with the model of
Grossman and Helpman and estimate the value of the parameter  to be between 50 and 88, a surprisingly
high range of values. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) also conclude that the model of Grossman and
Helpman is consistent with the data but estimate the value of  to be between 3 and 8. Bradford (2001)
proceeds to an empirical investigation of a variant of a model of Grossman and Helpman where politicians
maximize votes and nds that politicians weight a dollar of campaign contributions about 15% more than a
dollar of national income. This would lead to a value of  very close to 1.
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 The probability distribution F , which describes the respective frequencies of badand
goodlegislators.
We aim to examine the impact of each of these key parameters on the nal equilibrium
outcome of the political mechanism described by this inuence game. The outcome has two
dimensions:
 The policy which is ultimately selected by the legislators.
 The ex ante monetary o¤ers of the lobby and their ex post implementation.
In the rst part we assume that the types of the legislators are common knowledge,
an environment that we call political certainty as all the relevant variables are known with
certainty by all the players. Under that informational assumption, the legislature is described
by a general simple game, and we can investigate the role of the decision-making process
within the legislature. In this setting the lobbyist has an objective to obtain its preferred
policy at the lowest costs. The legislators can either reject or accept the lobbyists o¤er. In
the absence of contributions the legislators would vote against the policy. The legislators
can di¤er in two respects: the degree of inuence reected by voting weights as well as the
minimum prices they are willing to accept for swinging their vote reected by s. Clearly,
making contribution to a single legislator (as soon as he/she does not have the veto power)
does not guarantee the award of lobbyists preferred policy. We show how to calculate the
minimum budget the lobby needs to secure the required support as well as the distribution
of this budget between the legislators. We also demonstrate the connection of the problem
with the knapsack problem from combinatorial optimization.
In the second part we assume instead that the types of the legislators are private infor-
mations, and refer to this environment as political uncertainty as the lobbies when buying
votes and the legislators when voting do not know with certainty the consequences of their
choices. Under this informational assumption we limit our attention to a quota voting rule,
which requires a certain number of votes to pass the decision (quota) . We rst examine
the optimal lobbying strategy and demonstrate a critical role of the e¢ ciency threshold in
explaining the feature of this strategy. We show that the supermajorities may optimally oc-
cur due to the uncertainty about the legislatorstypes. As the cost of a politicians support
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is not known for sure, the lobby may try to increase its chances of success twofold. Firstly,
it may increase the amount of individual o¤ers. Secondly, it may disperse the inuence
over more legislators. We show that for relatively low values of the stake W0 (or e¢ ciency
threshold) the second e¤ect dominates, and the lobby makes o¤ers to all legislators. On the
contrary, for rather large values of the stake the rst e¤ect dominates: the lobby approaches
a minimal winning coalition of legislators and buys their support with certainty (treating
them as the most corrupted). One surprising feature of the optimal o¤er is that the larger
becomes the stake, the smaller is the coalition of legislators receiving an o¤er. To the best
of our knowledge, this outcome have not been recorded before.
In the last part we analyze whether the di¤erent assumptions may change the derived
conclusions. We distinguish between two possibilities concerning the behavior of the legis-
lators. The legislators may have strong preferences about the policy outcome regardless of
whether they have voted for or against this policy. Otherwise, the legislators may care about
their votes per ce regardless of the outcome. We also alternate the assumption about the
payments being contingent on the way the legislators vote (in favor or against the policy)
versus pivotal bribes (payments contingent on a vote being pivotal, Dal Bo, 2007). We
show that uncertainty about legislatorstypes makes the costless capture more di¢ cult.
1.1 Related Literature (not complete)
Some general positive models describing the lobbying process of a legislature have been
proposed by Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002), Boylan (2002), Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky
(2006, 2008), Helpman and Persson (2001), Polborn (2002) and Snyder (1991) among many
others. Papers by Dal Bo (2007) and Felgenhauer and Gruner (2008) study the impact
of external inuence on a committee from a mechanism design angle. In particular, they
compare open and closed voting and reach interesting conclusions. In contrast to this paper
they model the committee choice issue as a problem with common values as in Condorcet
juries.
Several papers consider a single lobbying group trying to inuence a committee under
certainty, as we do in the rst part. The closest work addressing similar questions is due to
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Young (1978c). However, in Young (1978c) the problem is considered from the legislators
point of view as they maximize the bribeincome, while the lobbyist is the price-taker.
As a result, at equilibrium the legislators may get strictly more than their reservation prices.
In contrast, in our setting, the price of a legislator is either zero (then he/she votes against
the policy) or it is equal to his/her reservation price (then the legislator acts in the interest of
the lobby and votes against the policy). Given the prices, the lobbys objective is to choose
whom to buy in order to minimize the total costs.
Our second part, where we introduce uncertainty, generalizes a single lobby case in Za-
porozhets (2006) and Le Breton and Zaporozhets (2007). Our main contribution is to ex-
plain an occurrence of supermajorities and an inverse relationship between their size and
the lobbys stake. There are other models explaining formation of supermajorities, however,
due to the competition of two opposed lobbying groups. Thus, Banks (2000) and Groseclose
and Snyder (1996) analyze the majority game with a heterogeneous legislature and show
under which conditions a supermajority is optimal. Diermeier and Myerson (1999) consider
a more general case but a homogeneous legislature, and concentrate on the architecture of
the legislative process that would minimize monetary o¤ers. Contrary to this literature,
we o¤er an alternative explanation: supermajorities may be optimal due to the uncertainty
about legislatorstypes. The uncertainty may induce the lobby to disperse its inuence over
a larger group of legislators in order to increase the prospects for a successful capture. To the
best of our knowledge nobody else highlighted the idea that with the increase of the stake,
the lobby spends more money, however, these money are distributed between less legislators.
This work also contributes to the voluminous literature on the protection for sale initiated
by Grossman and Helpman (1994).4 We assume the same preferences for the legislators: there
is a trade o¤ between the social welfare and the contributions from the lobby. However, we
relax the unitary governmenthypothesis used in this literature, the assumption that the
decisions on protection policies are taken by a single politician. At the same time, the
analysis under uncertainty may shed some lights to the puzzle of small contributions being
4See, for example, Baldwin and Magee, 2000, Mitra et al.,2002, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000,
Gawande and Hoekman, 2006 among others.
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able to buy the policy.5 Many empirical studies indicate that the US government is a welfare
maximizer as it puts very high weight on the social welfare (e.g., Goldberg and Maggy,
1999 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000). This is inconsistence with large estimates of
deadweight losses from the distortionary policy and low contributions.
Dal Bo (2007) shows that if there is a possibility to pay pivotal voters di¤erently, then
the lobby is able to buy the legislators essentially for free even if the legislators have strong
preferences about the outcome. We show that uncertainty about legislatorstypes makes
the costless capture more di¢ cult.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the main components of our vote-buying model. The lobbying
group tries to inuence the legislators to push forward the reform.6 The lobby is willing to
spend up to W0 dollars to pass the bill while the amount W1 would be paid to prevent the
passage of the bill. Sometimes, we will refer to these two policies in competition as being
policies 0 and 1. We assume that W  W1  W0 > 0, i.e., that policy 1 is the socially
e¢ cient policy. The ratio W0
W1
which is (by assumption) lower than 1 is called the e¢ ciency
threshold. It measures the intensity of the superiority of the status quo as compared to the
reform.
The legislature is described by a simple game, a pair (N;W) where N = f1; 2; :::; ng
is the set of legislators and W is the set of winning coalitions. The interpretation is the
following. A policy is adopted if and only if the subset of legislators who voted for the bill
forms a winning coalition. From that perspective, the set of winning coalitions describes the
rules operating in the legislature to make decisions. A coalition C is blocking if NnC is not
winning: some legislators (at least one) are needed to form a winning coalition. We denote
by B the subset of blocking coalitions7; from the denition, the status quo is maintained
as soon as the set of legislators who voted against the policy forms a blocking coalition.
5Gawande and Hoekman (2006) conclude that uncertainty may explain the paradox of high .
6The framework also covers the case of private bills as dened and analysed by Boylan (2002).
7In game theory, (N;W) is called the dual game.
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The simple game is called strong if B =W8. The set of minimal (with respect to inclusion)
winning (blocking) coalitions will be denoted Wm(Bm).
In this chapter, all legislators are assumed to act on behalf of social welfare, i.e., all of
them vote for policy 1 against policy 0 if no other event interferes with the voting process.
In contrast to Banks (2000) and Groseclose and Snyder (1996) we rule out the existence of
a horizontal heterogeneity across legislators. However, legislators also value money and we
introduce instead some form of vertical heterogeneity. Precisely, we assume that legislators
di¤er according to their willingness to depart from social welfare. The type of legislator i,
denoted by i; is the minimal amount of dollars that he/she needs to receive in order to
sacrice one dollar of social welfare. Therefore, if the policy adopted generates a level of
social welfare equal to W , the payo¤ of legislator i if he receives a transfer ti is:
ti + iW .
This payo¤ formulation is compatible with two behavioral assumptions. Either, the compo-
nent W appears as soon as the legislator has voted for a policy generating a level of social
welfareW regardless of the fact that this policy has been ultimately selected or not: we refer
to this model, as behavioral model P, where P stands for procedural. Or, the component
W appears whenever the policy ultimately selected generates a level of social welfare W
regardless of the fact that the legislator has voted for or against this policy: we refer to this
model, as behavioral model C, where C stands for consequential. In this paper, we analyze
the behavioral model C and explain in the last section how to adjust the results in the case
of behavioral model P.
To prevent passage of the bill, lobby can promise to pay money to individual legislators
conditional on their support of the status quo. We denote by ti  0 the (conditional) o¤ers
made to legislator i by the lobby. The corresponding n-dimensional vector is denoted by t.
The timing of actions and events that we consider to describe the lobbying game is the
following9.
1. Nature draws the type of each legislator.
8When the simple game is strong, the two competing alternatives are treated equally.
9Specic details and assumptions will be provided in due time.
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2. Lobby makes contingent monetary o¤ers to individual legislators.
3. Legislators vote.
4. Payments (if any) are implemented.
This game has n + 1 players. A strategy for a lobby is a vector in <n+. Each legislator
can chose among two (pure) strategies: to oppose or to support the bill.
The game is not fully described as we have not precisely dened yet the information held
by the players when they act. In this chapter we consider two distinct settings concerning
the move of player nature, but we assume otherwise that the votes of the legislators are
observable, i.e., we assume open voting10. The rst setting to which we refer as political
certainty corresponds to the case where the vector of legislatorss types is common knowledge.
This informational specication has two implications: rst, the lobbies know the types of
the legislators when making their o¤ers and second, each legislator knows the type of any
other legislator when voting. The second setting to which we refer as political uncertainty
corresponds instead to the case where the type of a legislator is private information. In such
case, not only the lobby ignore the types of the legislators but each potential continuation
voting subgame is a Bayesian game. This means that there is an adverse selection feature
in the strategic relationship between lobbies and legislators and a Bayesian feature in the
strategic interaction among legislators.
To conclude the description it remains to specify the details of the decision nodes. We
assume that the legislators know the o¤ers when they are asked to vote. We examine the
subgame perfect Nash equilibria11 of this lobbying game. In Section 3 we investigate the case
of political certainty. Then, in Section 4 we move to the case of political uncertainty.
10The comparative analysis of closed(secret) versus open voting is the subject of several contributions
among which Dal Bo (2002) and Felgenhauer and Grüner (2004).
11In the case of political uncertainty, the ultimate subgame is truly a Bayesian game that we solve using
Bayesian-Nash equilibria. We dont use the word Bayesian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as there is no
updating operation of beliefs in our game.
9
3 Benchmark: Political Certainty
In this section, we consider the case where the vector (1; 2; ::::; n) of legislatorss types is
common knowledge and, without loss of generality, we assume that 1  2  :::  n.
In order to pass the proposal the lobby has to buy the support of a winning coalition.
Let us denote it by S, then for each i 2 S
ti + iW0  iW1.
As the lobby would like to buy the support at the lowest costs, the minimum amount the
lobby should pay to legislator i 2 S voting in favor of the bill is12
ti = iW .
Note, that contrary to Young (1978), at equilibrium the legislators never get more than their
oor prices.
The problem of the lobbyist is to nd S 2 Wm, for which the total contribution is
minimal:13
min
S2Wm
X
i2S
i. (1)
The legislators j =2 S do not get any o¤ers from the lobbyist, i.e., tj = 0.
One may notice that if all i are identical, problem (1) is equivalent to identifying the
minimal winning coalition(s) of the smallest size:
min
S2Wm
jSj ,
where jSj denotes the size of coalition S.
3.1 The Knapsack Problem
Suppose that the game (N;W) is a weighted majority game, i.e., there exists an n-tuple
w = (w1; :::; wn) of non-negative weights with
P
i2N wi = 1 and quota q  0 such that any
12We assume that a legislator who is indi¤erent votes for the reform.
13The problem can be reformulated if the lobbyist is willing to block the bill instead of seeking to pass it.
Then we substitue S 2 Wm for T  2 Bm.
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S 2 W if and only if Pi2S wi  q.14 Then, the problem of nding S can be formulated as
the combinatorial problem called a knapsack problem (e.g., Pisinger, 1995 and Kellerer et
al., 2004):
min
zi
nP
i=1
izi
subject to the constraints
nP
i=1
wizi  q
zi 2 f0; 1g :
(2)
In the formulation (2) we refer to packing of n items into a knapsack. Each object i = 1; ::; n
is characterized by a pair (wi; i), where i is the value and wi is the weight of object i.
Integer zi indicates whether the object i is included in the knapsack (zi = 1) or not (zi = 0).
The objective is to minimize the total weight of the knapsack
nP
i=1
izi while maintaining the
total value
nP
i=1
wizi above the threshold q.
There is strong theoretical evidence that for the knapsack problem no polynomial time
algorithm exists for computing its optimal solution (e.g., Kellerer et al., 2004). In fact, the
knapsack problem belongs to a class of so-called NP-hard optimization problems, for which
there does not exist any polynomial time algorithm to nd an optimal solution. However, if
we consider the linear relaxation
zi 2 [0; 1] for all i = 1; :::; n;
things become simpler. Indeed, let us consider the impact of a small change (dzi; dzj) leaving
the constraint unchanged, i.e., such that widzi + wldzl = 0. The change in the objective is
equal to
idzi + jdzj = dziwi

i
wi
  j
wj

:
For i
wi
> i
wl
the change is positive if dzi is positive and negative otherwise. This suggests
the following optimal solution. Order the numbers

i
wi

1in
in increasing order. Let  be
that order. Then, dene
14Consequently, any T 2 B if and only if Pi2T wi  1  q.
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z(i) = 1 for all i = 1; ::; i   1
and
z(i) = q  
i 1X
i=1
w(i)z(i);
where
i = inf
1in
(
i :
i 1X
i=1
w(i)z(i)  q
)
:
This algorithm, called greedy algorithm, is simple but its performance under the integer
constraints is not clear. Thus, Kellerer et al. (2004) show that greedy solutions can be
arbitrary bad as compared to the optimal solution. Clearly, for small n one can nd the
solution by elementary checking as we illustrate in the examples below.
The problem has a straightforward solution in the symmetric case, when wi = 1 for all
i = 1; :::; n. Suppose for simplicity that 1  2  :::n. In such a case:
zi =
8<: 1 if i = 1; 2; :::; q;0 otherwise.
In general, the determination of a closed-form solution may be complicated because of
the trade-o¤ between the voting weight wi of player i and his reservation price i.
4 Political Uncertainty (behavioral model C)
In this section, we analyze the lobbying game under political uncertainty in a special case
where the simple game is the qualied majority game. Precisely, there is an odd number
n = 2k + 1 of legislators and the quota q 2 [k + 1; 2k + 1], i. e., at least q votes is required
to pass the decision. If q = k + 1 we have a simple majority game, and if q = 2k + 1 we
have a unanimity game. We assume that the types i of the legislators are independently
and identically distributed from a continuous cumulative distribution function F with the
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bounded support [; ] where 0   < .15 We denote by f the probability density function,
which is assumed to be strictly positive on the whole interval [; ]. Finally, we assume that
the hazard rate F
f
is increasing and that the hazard rate 1 F
f
is decreasing.
4.1 The Optimal Strategy of the Lobby
The contractual problem faced by the lobby amounts to the selection of a vector t 2 <n+
conditional on veriable information. Given our observability assumptions, this information
consists of the n-dimensional vector of individual votes. In principle, the lobby could make
the payment to legislator i contingent upon the votes of other legislators as well or a general
statistic depending upon the whole prole of votes. We assume here that the reward to
legislator i is simply based on his own vote: legislator i receives ti if and only if he voted
against the bill. This excludes, for instance, the ingenious contractual solution of Dal Bo
(2002) where a given legislator is paid only in the event where his vote has been decisive.
The rest of this section is devoted to a complete analysis of this principal-agent(s)
problem, i.e., to a characterization of the main features of the optimal strategy t. Let
N0  fi 2 N : ti > 0g be the set of legislators who have been promised to receive bribes by
the lobby in the optimal strategy, and we denote by n0 the number of those legislators.
This is an important feature of the strategy as it provides an answer to the question:
how large is the supermajority bought by the lobby? A second feature is the total amount
of money paid by the lobby. From its perspective, this is a risky prospect, as it does not
know for sure what will be the behavioral response of the legislators. Therefore, the amount
M0 
P
i2N t

i just represents the upper bound of the range of this random variable. Other
parameters of interest are the rst E0 and second V

0 moments of this random variable. The
expected rate of return of this investmentis then given by:
W0   E0
E0
:
The third and last feature of the strategy that deserves to be investigated is the distri-
bution of M0 across legislators. We have seen in section 3 that, when the simple game is
15Therefore, the probability that any legislator has a type less than or equal to some  is F ().
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not symmetric, i.e., when some legislators are more powerful than others or when they are
not perfect substitutes, we should expect some di¤erentials in the way they will be treated
by the lobby. However, when the game is symmetric, they are all o¤ered the same amount.
Our assumption that the legislators are all identical ex ante together with the fact that the
majority game is symmetric suggest that it will happen here too. This is not straightforward
and calls for a proof, as the behavioral responses of the legislature following any possible
history of o¤ers is now more complicated. In cases where uniformity across the bribed legis-
lators is shown to be optimal, we can, without loss of generality, limit ourselves to strategies
dened by two dimensions: an integer n0 and a real number t.
4.1.1 The Voting Subgame(s)
Given any prole of o¤ers t, a Bayesian strategy for legislator i in the continuation voting
subgame is a mapping i from the set of types [; ] into f0; 1g : i(T0; i) = 0 means that
legislator i votes for the status quo when T0 is the vector of standing o¤ers and his type is
i.
A key determinant of legislator i strategic evaluation is the probability pi of being pivotal.
Legislator i of type i with an o¤er equal to ti votes for policy 0 if and only if
ti + piiW0  piiW1: (3)
The Bayesian decision rule is therefore described by a cut point bi: legislator i votes for
the reform if his type i is below the cut point and votes for the status quo. The cut pointbi is dened as bi = max;min ti
piW
; 

: (4)
Under the restriction that o¤ers are uniform i.e. ti  t for all i 2 N0, all legislators in N0
face the same decision problem. Hereafter, we will restrict our attention here to symmetric
equilibria i.e. we assume that these legislators use the same decision rule. We will denote byb the cut point describing this strategy and by p the probability of being pivotal for any of
them. For the legislators outside N0, voting for the reform is a dominant strategy.
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For any legislator i in N0 the probability p of being pivotal is simply the probability that
exactly q  1 other legislators vote for the status quo. Since the legislators in N nN0 always
vote for the reform, this is the probability of the event that exactly q   1 legislators from
N0 nfig vote for the status quo. Given the cut point b, it is possible to write down explicitly
the formula for p:
p = p(t; n0; b) = Bq 1 [n0   1; F (b)] , (5)
where Bk [n; p] = Cknp
k(1   p)n k denotes the probability of the event k for a binomial
random variable with parameters n and p. The pivotal probability depends upon the voting
strategies played by the other legislators. The equilibrium pivotal probability will be a
solution of (5) when b is the equilibrium cut point. Since the equilibrium cut point is itself
dependent upon the equilibrium pivotal probability, we are left with an existence issue which
is covered by the following proposition16.
Proposition 1 For any given t  0 and n0, the continuation voting subgame has two in-
terior symmetric equilibria  < bL < bR <  and  as a corner equilibrium. The low cut
point equilibrium bL is increasing in t, and it Pareto dominates17 the two other equilibria.
Proof. The proof of the rst assertion is divided into two cases.
(i) n0 = q, i.e., the lobby o¤ers positive transfers to a qualied majority of voters.
In this case the unique cut-o¤ level exists. Applying (5) one gets that p = F q 1(b).
Substituting it into (4) it follows that for t 2 (W;1) the cut point b = , and for
t 2 [0; W ] it is dened by bF q 1(b) = t=W . (6)
From the assumptions on the distribution function it follows that the LHS of this equality is
16A game with similar features has been examined by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) as describing the
decision to vote in an election given that voters incur a private cost to do so. In their model voters compare
this cost to the expected di¤erential benet. They also face the issue of multiplicity of equilibria.
17Some warning is needed about what we mean by Pareto dominance. Precisely, we refer to unanimity in
restriction to the coalition N0 of legislators. It represents a way to solve the coordination issue faced by
this subset of players.
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a strictly increasing function of b, therefore b is uniquely dened by (6). One can see thatb is an increasing function of t.
(ii) n0 > q, i.e., the number of voters receiving positive o¤ers from the lobby is higher
than a qualied majority.
In this case there can be 3, 2 or 1 equilibrium cut-o¤ levels. From (5) the probability of
being pivotal is
Cq 1n0 1F
q 1(b)(1  F (b))n0 q.
First, let us consider the function
F q 1()(1  F ())n0 q:
One can see that on the interval [; ] it is non-negative: it is equal to zero at  and , and
it is strictly positive elsewhere on the interval. It has exactly one maximum at n0 2 (; ),
where n0 is dened by
@
@

F q 1()(1  F ())n0 q = 0;
or
F q 2()(1  F ())n0 q 1 [F ()(1  F ()) + f() [(q   1)  (n0   1)F ()]] = 0; (7)
To see that n0 is uniquely dened on the interval (; ) let us rewrite the expression in the
brackets in (7) as
F ()(1  F ())

1

+ (q   1) f
F
()  (n0   q) f
1  F ()

= 0:
From the assumptions on the hazard rates it follows that the function in the brackets is
monotonically decreasing, and for !  it approaches to +1 and for !  it approaches
to  1. Therefore, it can be equal to zero exactly at one point n0 2 (; ).
For convenience let
tmax = C
q 1
n0 1n0WF
q 1(n0)(1  F (n0))n0 q:
From (4), (5) for t 2 [0; tmax) there are two solutions for b dened by
F q 1()(1  F ())n0 q = t
Cq 1n0 1W
: (8)
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We denote them by bL and bR and assume that bL  bR. For all t 2 (0;1) there is also
the solution b = .
Consider now the second assertion. The expected utility of agent i is
Ui (i; b) =
8<: P 1(b)iW1 + (1  P 1(b))iW0; for i  bP 0(b)iW0 + (1  P 0(b))iW1 + t; for i  b ;
where P 1 (respectively P 0) is the probability that at least k other agents from N0 choose 1
(respectively 0).
First, let us consider the case i  b. The expected utility can be written as
Ui(i; b) = iW1  WP 0(b)i + t:
The probability P 0 can be written as
P 0(b) = n0 1X
i=q 1
Cin0 1F
i(b) (1  F (b))n0. 1 i :
From lemma 1 it follows that
@P 0
@b = f(b)(n0   k)Cq 2n0 1F k(b)(1  F (b))n0 q  0:
Thus, P 0(b) is increasing and therefore, expected utility is decreasing in b: Then, Ui(i; bL) 
Ui(i; bR), i.e., in the equilibrium bL utility of each agent i is at least as high as in equilibriumbR. The case i  b is similar.
In solving backward the whole game, we solve each terminal voting subgames following
a pair (t; n0) by considering the equilibrium bL = bL(t; n0) which will be denoted simply
by b = b(t; n0) without risk of confusion. In what follows we will also use the fact thatbL 2 [0; n0 ] :
4.1.2 The Optimal O¤er of the Lobby
We are now in position to investigate the two dimensions of the optimal strategy of the
lobby. Given t and N0, the probability of accepting the contribution by any legislator in N0
is simply F (b) and the probability of success for the lobby is
G(b; n0) = n0X
j=q
Bj [n0; F (b)] : (9)
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Therefore, the expected payo¤ of the lobby is
G(b; n0)W0   n0F (b)t.
First, we as t is a non-decreasing function of  on the interval [0; n0 ], we may optimize
the expected payo¤ with respect to  instead of optimizing with respect to t. Second, for
convenience we divide the expected payo¤ by the positive constant W and consider the
following function:
(b; n0) = G(b; n0)r   T (b; n0); (10)
where we denote by
r =
W0
W
and
T (; n0) =
F q()(1  F ())n0 q
B(q; n0 + 1  q)
is the expected total transfer from the lobby.
In what follows we often use the following function:
(; n0) =
F q 1()(1  F ())n0 q
B(q; n0 + 1  q) ; (11)
and we can re-express expected total transfer as:
T (; n0) = F ()(; n0).
By our assumptions @(;n0)
@
 0. Then, the maximization problem is considered for the
following range of the variables: 
 =
n
(; n0) : n0 2 fq; :::; ng ,  2 [; ] and @(;n0)@  0
o
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and the parameter r 2 (0;+1].
Remark 1. If we arrange random variables 1; 2; :::n in order of magnitude and write
them down as (1)  (2)  :::  (n), where (i) is called the ith order statistic. Then
we may notice that the expression (9) is the cdf of the qth order statistic for (1)  (2) 
18By our assumptions (; n0) is non-decreasing in  on the interval, and the equilibrium value of our
interest bL.
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:::  (n0), and it can be rewritten in terms of incomplete beta function (e.g., David and
Nagaraja, 2003):
F(q;n0)(b) =
F (b)Z
0
tq 1(1  t)n0 qdt
B(q; n0   q   1) ; (12)
where B(a; b) 
1Z
0
ta 1(1  t)b 1dt is beta-function. One may notice that if F (b) is the cdf
of the uniform distribution on [0; 1] then F(q;n0)(b) is the cdf of beta distribution.
The following proposition describes the optimal o¤er t when the lobby buys a minimal
winning coalition.
Proposition 2 When n0 = q, the equilibrium o¤er t is uniquely dened:
(i) for r 2 [0; q] the equilibrium o¤er t = 0;
(ii) for r 2

q; q + 1
1+f()

the equilibrium o¤er t = aF q 1(a)W < W , where
a 2 (; ) is the unique solution to the equation:
r   qa = F (a)
f(a)
:
(iii) for r 2
h
q + 1
1+f()
;+1

the equilibrium o¤er t = W .
Proof. After substituting for t from (6) the expected payo¤ of the lobby 0 becomes
(q; b) = F q(b) (r   qb) :
The rst-order condition with respect to b is:
@(q; b)
@b = qF q 1(b)f(b)

r   qb  F (b)
f(b)

= 0:
First, consider the equation
r   qb = F (b)
f(b) (13)
on the interval b 2 (; ). By the assumption on the hazard rate the RHS is an increasing
function of b, and the LHS is a decreasing one. Therefore, these two functions can intersect
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at most once on the interval (; ). It is easy to see that interior solution amax(q) 2 (; )
exists if and only if r   q > 0 and r   q < 1
f()
.
Of course, it is not necessarily optimal for the lobby to buy a minimal winning coalition.
It may prefer to buy a supermajority. Given the fact that the function  is continuous
with respect to t (equivalently, ), and that n0 takes a nite number of values, an optimal
strategy is always well dened. In what follows, we investigate the following general questions
concerning the equilibrium strategy of the lobby.
 Is it the case that lobbying activities are normal goods, i.e., exhibiting positive income
e¤ects?
 Is it the case that the size of the coalition of legislators approached by the lobby decreases
as the stake becomes larger?
Not surprisingly, the larger is r (or, equivalently, the stake W0), the more money the
lobby spends to buy votes. What is more intriguing, however, is that this money is spent on
less legislators, i.e., the size of the coalition to which o¤ers are made becomes smaller. When
the lobby nds it optimal to bribe the simple majority it o¤ers the maximum possible bribe
to be sure the o¤ers are accepted, i.e., the legislators are treated as being of the highest type
.
There exist thresholds r and r, such that
for r 2 [0; r] the lobby does not bribe anybody;
for r 2 (r; r) the optimal n0 is non-increasing and t is non-decreasing;
for r 2 [r;1) the optimal n0 is q (a qualied majority) and t = W .
The proposition below establishes a lower bound for r.
Proposition 3 For r  q the lobby does not intervene, i.e., the optimal transfers are t = 0.
Proof. One may check that
@(; n0)
@
= Cqn0(1  F ())n0 q 1  (14)
(1  F ())@(; q)
@
+ q(n0   q)F q()f()

:
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Therefore,
lim
!
@(; n0)
@
= Cqn0
@(; q)
@
:
From Proposition 2 the derivative @(;q)
@
 0 for the indicated values of r.
In what follows we apply monotone comparative statics theorems (e.g., Topkis, 1998 and
Milgrom and Shanon, 1999) in order to state our main result.
Proposition 4 If
@(; n0)
@
= 0
then
@2(; n0)
@@n0
 0.
Proof. Remark 1 implies
@G(; n0)
@
=
F q 1() (1  F ())n0 q f()
B(q; n0   q   1) : (15)
Then, we deduce that
@2G(; n0)
@@n0
=
@G(; n0)
@
[ln(1  F ()) +  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q)] ; (16)
where  (x) is the logarithmic derivative of the gamma function.19
Similarly,
@2T (; n0)
@@n0
=
@T (; n0)
@
[ln(1  F ()) +  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q)] (17)
 T (; n0) f()
1  F () .
Combining (16) and (17) we get that
@2(; n0)
@@n0
=
@(; n0)
@
[ln(1  F ()) +  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q)]
+T (; n0)
f()
1  F () .
If @(;n0)
@
= 0 the above expression is equal to T (; n0)
f()
1 F () , which is non-negative on the
interval [; ].
19It is called digamma function (e.g., Andrews et al., 1999).
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Proposition 5 The following inequalities holds true:
@2(; n0)
@@r
 0
and
@2(; n0)
@r@n0
 0.
Proof. 1. From the expression (10) for the expected payo¤
@2(; n0)
@@r
=
@G(; n0)
@
;
which is calculated in (15). Obviously, it is non-negative on the interval [; ].
2. One may notice that
@2(; n0)
@r@n0
=
@G(; n0)
@n0
.
The idea is to show that the function @G(;n0)
@n0
is increasing in  for  2 (; e) and it is
decreasing for  2 (e; ) for some e. On top of that, this function is equal to zero for  = 
and . This would imply that @G(;n0)
@n0
 0 on the interval [; ].
From the expression (16) we deduce that e 2 (; ) is dened from:
ln(1  F ()) +  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q) = 0. (18)
Lemma 1 implies that
 (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q) = ln

 + n0
 + n0   q

.
Therefore, e = F 1  q
+n0

.
Corollary 6 If the function (; n0) has an inferior maximum then the optimal (r) and
n0(r) are increasing functions.
Proof. From Propositions 4 and 5 we may conclude that the second-order partial derivatives
of the function (; n0; r) are non-negative in the whole region 
. Then, the result follows
from Theorem 4 (Milgrom and Shanon, 1994).
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Proposition 7 The derivative
@(; n0)
@n0
 (; n0) [ln(1  F ()) +  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q)] :
Proof. It can be shown that
@T (; n0)
@n0
= T (; n0) [ln(1  F ()) +  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q)] :
Similarly,
@G(; n0)
@n0
=
F ()Z
0
tq 1(1  t)n0 q ln(1  t)dt
B(q; n0   q   1) +R(; n0) [ (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q)] :
The mean-value theorem implies that there is  2 (0; F ()) such that
F ()Z
0
tq 1(1  t)n0 q ln(1  t)dt
B(q; n0   q   1) = ln(1  )G(; n0) > ln(1  F ())G(; n0):
Therefore,
@G(; n0)
@n0
> G(; n0) [ln(1  F ()) +  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q)]
and the result follows.
Proposition 7 implies that for  such that (; n0)  0 and  2 (; e) (where e is dened
by (18)) the derivative @(;n0)
@n0
 0, which means that the optimal n0 is maximal possible in

. This conclusion together with Corollary 6 leads us to the main result:
Proposition 8 The optimal pairs (; n0) lie on the border of the set 
.
Our results imply that when we move along the part of the border, on which n0 = n, the
optimal  should increase with respect to r. As the individual o¤er t is also an increasing
function of r, then, the function T should be also increasing in r on this part of the border.
In what follows we establish what happens when we get on another part of the border,
l =
n
(; n0) :
@(;n0)
@
= 0
o
. Below we show that the optimal n0 is a decreasing function of r.
The monotone comparative statics theorems suggest that we need to check if the second-order
derivative @
2(;n0)
@r@
> 0 for (; n0) 2 l. This is equivalent to the following statement.
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Proposition 9 The derivative
d
d
T (; n0()) > 0;
where20
n0() =
1  F ()
f()
+
q   1
F ()
+ 1: (19)
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Remark 2. From the proof it follows that the assumption on the hazard rate can be
weakened. In fact, we need just that1 F ()
f()
be decreasing in  and F ()
f()
be increasing in :
Proposition 9 implies that along the border l the total expected contributions T from the
lobby is an increasing function of r. Combining this with the earlier observation, we may
conclude that T is increasing in r on the whole border of 
:
Proposition 10 For r > q + 1
1+f()
the optimal n0 = q and the optimal  = .
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 2 and (19).
4.2 Pivotal Bribes
Following Dal Bo (2007), in this subsection we would like to investigate a situation in which
the lobby has the possibility to o¤er di¤erent rewards to the pivotal legislators.
One may notice that under certainty the costless capture is possible. Suppose for sim-
plicity s are arranged in a non-decreasing order. Then, the lobby o¤ers Wi to (q + 1)
cheapest legislators. We assume that the o¤ers should be credible, i.e., the budget W0
should be at least
q+1X
i=1
Wi. (20)
Under uncertainty, the costless capture is possible if the lobby o¤ers t = W  to q + 1
voters. Therefore, for being credible, the lobby should possess at least (q + 1)W , which
is higher than (20).
20This expression is rewritten (7).
24
One may notice that when considering the voting subgame(s), legislator i of type i with
an o¤er ti votes for the status quo if and only if
piti + piiW0  piiW1:
Therefore, the expression for the cut point bi becomes:
bi = max;min ti
W
; 

:
Following the above steps we derive the following expected payo¤ function for the lobby:
(b; n0) = G(b; n0)r   T (b; n0);
where
r =
W0
W
.
The expected transfers are
T (; n0) = qC
q
n0
F q()(1  F ())n0 q,
reect that there are only pivotal members are paid. One may notice that the optimization
problem is equivalent the problem already analyzed with the less restricted set of variables:
n0 2 fq; :::; ng and b 2 [; ]. Along the lines of the previous section, we establish the
following result.
Proposition 11 (?)Suppose that r  (q + 1) (i.e., the costless capture is not possi-
ble).Then, there exist thresholds r and r, such that
for r 2 [0; r] the lobby does not bribe anybody;
for r 2 (r; r) the optimal n0 = n; and t is non-decreasing;
for r 2 [r; (q + 1)) the optimal n0 = q and t = W .
4.3 Procedurial versus Consequential
Before we assumed that the legislators had strong preferences about the policy outcome
regardless of whether they have voted for or against this policy. In this subsection, to the
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contrary, we assume that the legislators care about their votes per ce regardless of the
outcome.
Following the lines of Section 4, let us consider rst the voting subgames. In contrast to
the model C, it does not matter whether the legislator is pivotal. A legislator i of type i
with an o¤er equal to ti votes for the status quo if and only if:
ti + iW0  iW1:
The decision rule is therefore described by a cut point bi : legislator i votes for the status
quo if his type i is below the cut point and votes for the reform otherwise. The cut pointbi is dened as bi = max;min ti
W
; 

(21)
Recall N0  fi 2 N : ti > 0g. Under the restriction that o¤ers are uniform, i. e., ti  t
for all i 2 N0, all legislators in N0 face the same decision problem. Again, we restrict our
attention here to symmetric equilibria and denote the cut point describing this strategy byb. For the legislators outside N0, voting for the reform is a dominant strategy.
Following the steps of the previous section, the expected payo¤ of the lobby for given t
and n0 is
(b; n0) = G(b; n0)r   T (b; n0);
where G(t; n0) and r are dened as before and
T (b; n0) = n0bF (b).
One may notice that the expressions for
@2(; n0)
@@r
and
@2(; n0)
@r@n0
the same as in the model C.
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5 Conclusion
6 Appendix
Lemma 1 There exists   (n0; q) such that  2 (1=2; 1) and
 (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q) = ln( + n0)  ln( + n0   q): (22)
Proof. First, we notice that the right-hand side of (22) can be rewritten as
ln

1 +
q
 + n0   q

;
which is a decreasing function of .
Next, the left-hand side can be rewritten as
q 1X
i=0
1
n0   i (e.g., Andrews et al., 1999)
or, it is equivalent to
n0X
i=n0 q+1
1
i
.
Lastly, we are going to show that
ln

 + n0
 + n0   q

 
n0X
i=n0 q+1
1
i
8<:  0, if  = 1 0, if  = 1
2
: (23)
It is enough to prove the result since the function in (23) is continuous and decreasing in .
Notice that
ln

 + n0
 + n0   q

=
n0X
i=n0 q+1
ln

1 +
1
 + i  1

: (24)
For  = 1 the sum in (24) boils down to
n0X
i=n0 q+1
ln

1 +
1
i


qX
i=1
1
i
:
This proves the rst part of (23).
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In order to prove the necessary inequality for  = 1=2, we use the following lower bound:
lnx  2x  1
x+ 1
:
Then, the expression (24) can be evaluated as
n0X
i=n0 q+1
ln

1 +
1
i  1=2


qX
i=1
1
i
;
which proves the second part of (23).
Proof of Proposition 9.
One may check that
d
d
T (; n0()) = (; n

0())

f() +
dn0
d
F ()
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0

:
For convenience we denote the expression in the brackets by H. Then, the proof will follow
the following steps.
1. Show that dn

0
d
< 0;
2. It is possible to nd some constant A such that
 dn

0
d
F ()  A;
3. It is possible to nd some constant B such that
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0
 B;
4. If B  0 then AB < 1:
One can notice that if
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0
< 0
then obviously H > 0. If the opposite inequality is true, i.e., then
dn0()
d
F ()
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0
 AB < 1;
which implies H > 0. Let us proceed step by step.
1. Follows from the expression (19) for n0 and the assumption on the hazard rate.
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2. For further convenience, let us introduce the following variable
() =
F ()
f()
:
Then, (19) implies
F () =
() + q   1
() + n0()  1
: (25)
We can calculate the derivative
dn0()
d
= f()

  1
f()
  q   1
F 2()

  (1  F ()) 1
(f())2
[f() + f 0()] : (26)
The assumption on the hazard rate can be reformulated as
f 0()  f
2()
F ()
;
and then (26) implies:
 dn

0()
d
 f()

q   1
F 2()
+
1  F ()
(f())2
+
1
f()F ()

: (27)
Substituting for
 =
F ()
f()
;
one gets
 dn

0()
d
F ()  f()

q   1
F 2()
+ 2

1
F ()
  1

+

F ()

:
Then, we dene A as:
A =

2
 + q   1 + 1

( + n0()  1) :
3. One may check that
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0
=  (n0 + 1)   (n0 + 1  q) + ln(1  F ()):
Applying Lemma and (25) we get
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0
= ln

 + n0()
 + n0()  q
n0()  q
 + n0()  1

:
We denote by C the argument of the ln above. Then,
C = 1 +
1
 + n0()  1
0@ 1  n0() q   n0() 1n0() q
n0() q + 1
+ (1  ) 1
n0() q + 1
1A :
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Using the fact that
n0()  1
n0()  q
 2
and that
1

n0() q + 1
 1;
we obtain that, C  1     : Therefore,
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0
 ln

1 +
1     
 + n0()  1

:
Further,
@ lnT (; n0())
@n0
 1     
 + n0()  1
:
Finally, we denote by
B =
1     
 + n0()  1
:
4. The expressions for A and B imply
AB =

2
 + q   1 + 1

(1     ) :
One may check that B  0 if and only if   1   < 1=2: Then,
AB <

1=4
q   1 + 1

1
2
< 1:
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